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Abstract 
Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei for short) is a leading Japanese daily newspaper specializing 
in economy and business. It is also the largest vendor of Japanese financial and economic 
databases. During earnings announcement season, the Nikkei morning edition often 
publishes “preview” articles that are about companies’ sales and earnings. However, these 
pre-date the actual company announcements, and forecast more accurately the actual results 
than the existing forecasts, making the Nikkei forecasts value-relevant information. We 
identify 2,899 preview articles in the newspaper from 2000 to 2010. We examine the 
circumstances under which these preview articles are written and the impact they have on the 
market. Our (preliminary) findings show that the market reacts to the information even before 
the preview articles are printed, suggesting some leakage of the information to market 
participants. The costs and benefits (or incentives) for companies, Nikkei, and investors are 
investigated using changes in returns and information content around the events.  
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“If you wanted to find out what Toyota Motor Corp., NTT Docomo Inc. and Canon Inc. earned 
last year before they reported results, the best guide wasn’t analyst or company predictions. It 
was the Nikkei newspaper….. Of the 45 Nikkei articles analyzed by Bloomberg News that 
contained profit figures that preceded the formal release results, 37 gave a number that was 
within 10 percent of the company’s result, or predicted a range that turned out to be correct.”1  
 
“… But in Japan, regulators seem to have turned a blind eye to the “Nikkei previews,” 
allowing stories appear and then, within a few hours, letting companies issue rote statements 
saying the stories are not based on anything they have announced….. Last year the Nikkei 
announced it would no longer supply instant English translations of stories to its 364,000 
online subscribers. But given that between 60 and 70 per cent of trading in Tokyo stocks is by 
foreigners, the effect of publishing earnings previews in the local language only is akin to 
“insider trading”, says Mr. [Nicholas] Smith of CLSA [in Tokyo]”2 
 
1. Introduction 
With about three million subscribers (in 2008), Nihon Keizai Shinbun (“Nikkei 
Newspaper,” or “Nikkei” for short) has the 4th largest printed and on-line circulation in Japan. 
It specializes in business and economy and is almost a “must” read for business people in 
Japan.3 There is a curious institutional phenomenon that has existed for a number of years in 
the Japanese market. In earnings announcement season, highly accurate sales and/or earnings 
numbers are reported by Nikkei before the firms’ official announcement. These preview 
announcements appear exclusive to Nikkei, and as we show below, the Nikkei’s preview 
articles are generally more accurate than managements’ own most recent publicly disclosed 
forecasts. In short, they contain value-relevant information. 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was enacted in 2000 in the United States. Its 
                                                   
1 Tom Redmont, Toshiro Hasegawa, and Aaron Clark, “Newspaper Has Lock on Prescience Covering Japan 
Earnings,” Bloomberg News, August 7, 2014. 
2 Ben McLannahan, “‘Nikkei previews’ spur complaints of home advantage in Tokyo,” Financial Times, 
August 5, 2014. 
3 The ranking of Japanese newspapers on circulation is as follows: 1. Yomiuri (circulation: 10 million); 2. 
Asahi (8 million); 3. Mainichi (3.9 million); and Nikkei (3 million); source: World Press Trends 2008, 
World Association of Newspapers. In comparison, the circulation of The Wall Street Journal is 2.3 million, 




intent was to create a level informational playing field for participants in the U.S. equities 
markets. The regulation stopped selective disclosure of value-relevant information about 
publicly traded companies. Corporations could no longer favor specific analysts or disclosure 
channels. Prior to its enactment, large institutional investors raised objections to Reg FD. 
Selective disclosure presumably gave large investors an edge – the potential to trade on 
information before it became widely known. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) find 
evidence that Reg FD significantly impacted returns to well-connected U.S. mutual fund 
managers, suggesting that selective disclosure was one source of excess return. Research on 
the effects of Reg FD suggests that it improved liquidity and increased trading volume (Heflin, 
Subramanyam, and Zhang 2003; Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2004 and Bailey, Karolyi, 
and Salva 2006). Researchers have found that cost of capital and liquidity effects have led to 
voluntary adoption of Reg FD standards by cross-listed firms even though they are explicitly 
exempt (Francis, Nanda, and Wang 2006; Crawley, Ke, and Yu 2011). Chen and Matsumoto 
(2006) find that analysts’ forecasts were more accurate prior to the barring of selective 
disclosure and document a correlation between favorable recommendations and selective 
disclosure; suggesting a quid pro quo relationship based on information. 
In general, the empirical evidence on selective disclosure, gleaned from studies 
around the promulgation of Reg FD in the year 2000 indicate that, prior to the law, publicly 
traded firms faced a tradeoff between liquidity and price efficiency. The research literature 
has not yet completely explored this tradeoff.  
One of the challenges in studying the effect of selective disclosure on market prices, 
volatility and liquidity around Reg FD is that there is little cross-sectional variation. When 
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the law was enacted, it applied universally across firms with respect to information affecting 
the value of their common stock (except for cross-listed companies). In contrast to the U.S. 
market, in Japan, there is heterogeneity in the institutional structure for information 
disclosure. Some firms choose to regularly communicate with Nikkei for preview articles 
prior to the official release of earnings and sales information while others do not. This 
heterogeneity provides us an opportunity to examine corporate tradeoffs between liquidity 
and price efficiency.  
The fact that selective disclosure is intermediated by a single news source introduces 
an additional level of usefulness. Nikkei – rather than the corporation – may realize the 
benefits of intermediating value-relevant information. Once Nikkei reporters have met with 
corporate executives to gather information for the preview article, they effectively share the 
potential value of this non-public information. 
 As a newspaper/news service, Nikkei presumably disseminates information to all 
subscribers simultaneously, however in doing so, it creates a potentially exploitable event – 
a disclosure date that is likely to have an effect on stock prices. Nikkei revenues derive from 
circulation to individual investors and subscriptions to data feeds to institutional clients. Both 
groups would recognize the potential benefits of an accurate preview of an adjustment to 
prior earnings forecast. However, if one group knew before-hand the content of the preview, 
the potential for exploiting other Nikkei subscribers is significant. In this study we are not 
able to discern how some investors become aware of Nikkei previews prior to publication, 
and furthermore this is not the focus of the paper. Rather we are interested in using these 




We hypothesize that firms held widely by institutional investors have an incentive to 
do previews that would allow fund managers to generate positive alpha. Jiang and Sun (2014) 
provide evidence consistent with this hypothesis for U.S. mutual funds. Stocks held by firms 
taking unusually high positions in the company around earnings announcements experience 
positive returns. The authors interpret this as evidence that some fund managers in the U.S. 
trade on private value-relevant information about earnings surprises. On the other hand, firms 
that are closely held – for which adverse selection is a significant concern for uninformed 
investors – are more likely to eschew selective disclosure which would exacerbate bid-ask 
spreads and illiquidity. 
We further hypothesize that the particular information structure we identify in the 
Japanese market allows informed investors to exploit pre-earnings announcement previews 
in order to trade in an environment that is less suspicious of adverse selection. Unlike 
earnings announcement dates which are known in advance, Nikkei previews are not pre-
scheduled and thus can be scheduled unexpectedly prior to announcement at a time when 
noise-traders and market-makers are less likely to expect to trade against informed traders. 
Some accounting research has approached selective disclosure from the behavioral 
angle. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) attribute attenuated price response around earning 
announcements on Fridays to investor inattention. Neissner (2014) finds that managers 
strategically exploit the inattention effect by disclosing negative information on Fridays. 
Hand (1990) showed that market prices reacted to the disclosure in annual filings of events 
disclosed in prior quarters, suggesting that markets only partially react to value-relevant news. 
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This is the main hypothesis behind the well-documented post-earnings announcement drift 
phenomenon (Bernard and Thomas 1989) and the subject of papers by Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003), Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009, 2011) and others. One broad result of their analysis 
of accounting anomalies is that these are consistent with limited investor attention and 
capacity for analysis. In a setting where a large quantity of potentially value-relevant 
information is disclosed around the same time, the Hirshleifer et al. framework would predict 
sub-optimal reaction to the news. If, for example, investors use a pecking order to decide 
which of many securities to trade after a joint earnings announcement, this would lead to 
trades for which information is considered timely, reliable and significant enough to 
overcome the cost (in money and attention) of exploiting. Knowing this, the manager of a 
publicly traded firm who believes the market price fails to incorporate private, positive 
information would choose to shift the timing of value-relevant news to times when investor 
information overload is less, to choose a venue in which the disclosure is most credible (i.e., 
the risk of “cheap talk” is minimal). The management would also prefer disclosure to 
sophisticated investors who understood its relevance, and for whom the motivation – in terms 
of trading profits to speculators – is non-trivial. 
Recent research has explored corporate use of alternative communication channels to 
increase awareness about firms around key events such as insider sales and earnings 
announcements. Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2009) show that media coverage around 
earnings announcements mitigate asymmetric information concerns. Fang and Peress (2009) 
find media coverage is a component of security prices. Lou (2014) documents an increase in 
advertising expenditure in the year before negative earnings surprises and around a period of 
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insider sales. Madsen and Neisner (2014) use observed advertising to rule out reverse 
causality as a potential explanation for the association between insider sales and advertising 
expenditures.    
Not having Reg FD (as in Japan) presents a set of opportunities for management 
disclosure strategies. For example, giving one news source with a broad subscriber base an 
“exclusive” is a means to ensure that the disclosure will be highlighted and will attract 
sufficient investor attention. Disclosing big changes that are worth the transactions cost to 
exploit will motivate trading. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, it may be in the 
interest of a firm whose price suffers from the market’s failure to incorporate information, to 
allow information to leak in advance of a public (and even an exclusive) announcement to 
ensure that some market participants with the capacity to move prices are sufficiently 
incentivized to trade. 
This strategy may seem contrary to the interest of shareholders, however price 
inefficiency due to behavioral limitations of the market also presents problems for the 
corporation and its shareholders. These include higher cost of capital, segmented cost of 
capital across financing forms and locations, inaccurate compensation rules and 
categorization at the margins of the firm as a small cap or value stock, with further costs of 
capital. Selective disclosure that results in speculative profits by informed traders at the 
expense of uninformed shareholders may be the cost of insuring that the market fully 
impounds good news.4 
Although Reg FD and the zero-tolerance enforcement of insider trading laws in the 
                                                   
4 There is a long literature about the costs and benefits of allowing insider trading (Fishman and Hagerty 
1992; Leland 1992).  
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U.S. restrict the ability to examine the instances and effects of strategic disclosure, the 
structure of information dissemination around earnings announcements of Japanese 
companies allows us to test what is lost and what is gained with Reg FD. While insider trading 
is against the law, it is not uncommon to see unusual price movement and volume prior to 
significant events in many markets. This might be a consequence of a free rider problem. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) point out that a market must compensate investment research 
through trades that are profitable enough to support it. In such a market, the majority of 
investors (and firms) can enjoy the benefits of free-riding on price efficiency. However 
removing channels for profitable research such as private discussions with management 
reduces the arbitrage in expectations that enforce markets. Information leakage prior to 
announcements may be one strategy to address free-riding.  
In this paper we collect data on Japanese firms around earnings announcements and 
identify a large sample of preview news articles that report accurate sales and/or earnings 
numbers. Using this sample we test the following hypotheses using an event study 
methodology. 
First, we test whether preview announcements actually contain value-relevant 
information. We find that stock returns around positive preview articles are positive and 
significant, consistent with the hypothesis that firms release value-relevant information prior 
to the official earnings announcement. We also ask whether – consistent with management 
seeking to reduce market under-reaction to good news – Nikkei previews that report positive 
earnings surprises are more frequent. We find that they are: the ratio of positive to negative 
earnings news in preview articles is 1.63. Looking more closely at the preview forecasts, we 
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find that positive previews are relatively conservative (they are less likely to report numbers 
higher than those subsequently officially released) and negative forecasts are relatively 
optimistic (they are more likely to report numbers higher than those subsequently officially 
released).  
In terms of stock price reactions, for non-previewing firms we find that prices rise 
significantly around release of positive earnings news and drop around release of negative 
earnings news. For previewing firms we find only a positive price reaction. This is consistent 
with an endogenous choice made by firms to preview. Firms may only release bad news via 
a preview when they believe it will not hurt stock price (or will not induce short-selling), and 
they may release good information via a preview when they believe it will cause a positive 
price jump. 
For previewing firms the significant price movement occurs around the date of the 
preview article. There is little evidence of a “double reaction” i.e., first at preview, and then 
once again at the official release of earnings information. In other words, there is little 
evidence of under-reaction to recent prior news released via Nikkei. 
One interesting difference between the reactions around preview articles vs. earnings 
announcements by non-previewing firms is that the spread in cumulative average residuals 
(CAR) is persistent over the next two weeks for previewing firms but converges for non-
previewing firms. If anything, this is evidence for market over-reaction to the official 
earnings announcement as opposed to the widely documented post earnings announcement 
under-reaction. This differential is consistent with the hypothesis that the firms use the Nikkei 
channel to disseminate value-relevant information to sophisticated investors who will 
10 
 
correctly interpret it and react quickly and permanently to it. 
We also document evidence that the value-relevant information is released prior to 
both official earnings announcements for non-previewers and also for Nikkei previews. Price 
changes measured from open to open on the day prior to the official announcement (made 
during trading hours) or the Nikkei preview (available prior to market open) indicates leakage 
of news. For both groups, the returns on announcement day itself are flat. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that information when it appears in the news is already impounded in 
stock prices. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that Japanese firms use selective disclosure to 
strategically incentivize market participants to impound positive information into stock 
prices. Nikkei previews are evidently an important channel. They serve as a coordinating 
event around which (i.e., before which) informed investors trade and move stock prices. This 
strategy results in permanent changes to firm market value that are positive, on average. In 
contrast, price increases due to informed trading in shares of firms that do not preview their 
results appear to be temporary. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. Sections 3 through 
6 characterize the preview articles in terms of their role as a disclosure medium of 
information to the market. In Section 7, we examine market’s reactions to the Nikkei preview 
articles. Section 8 investigates incentives and costs/benefits for all parties (Nikkei, companies, 





During the annual corporate earnings announcement season, all listed firms’ 
announcements are published in the Nikkei Morning Edition in the form of tables. In this 
table, financial results (sales, operating income, ordinary income, net income, earnings per 
share, and per share dividends) of the most recent year are tabulated, as well as the numbers 
from the previous year and management forecast for the next year. Similar announcements 
are made and tables are published, at the half-year point, again on the day following the 
announcement. The management forecast of the coming half-year may be updated, based 
on the information available to the firm at this time. This management forecast is reported 
by almost all listed firms (Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura 2009). Management forecasts may 
be revised, not only in half-year intervals, but also when there is a substantive new 
information about corporate performance. These “stand-alone” revisions of management 
forecasts are also reported in Nikkei the next day. Due to the internationalization of the 
Japanese equity market, beginning in 2004, the Tokyo Stock Exchange started to encourage 
its listed firms to report quarterly figures, in addition to half-year results. Quarterly reporting 
became mandatory from October, 2008. Now all firms announce cumulative quarterly 
results. Management forecasts, however, are not on quarterly basis, and announced only on 
a half-year basis and stand-alone basis. 
In addition to the tables of corporate financial reporting, Nikkei writes text articles 
on some selected firms. In another paper, Goetzmann, Hamao, and Takahashi 2014) we use 
sentiment analysis applied to the text content of these articles in order to examine the 
interaction between price, sentiment and news.  
Like all news organizations, Nikkei also writes about companies as other news occurs. 
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However, before the annual, semi-annual or quarterly financial performance is officially 
announced by a firm, Nikkei often writes articles that effectively “preview” the results.  
We extract all news articles that appear to have information on performance figures 
that are about to be announced from a database of over a million Nikkei text articles from 
2000 to 2010, using text searches. We rely on keywords that refer to fiscal year, unit (Japanese 
Yen), and expressions pertinent to previews such as “about” or “likely to be.”5 As a result, 
we obtain more than 8,000 potential previews, although the actual number may be more. 
After extraction, we read all of them and isolate articles that preview financial results, prior 
to actual announcements. These articles explicitly discuss forthcoming figures on sales 
and/or operating income and/or ordinary income and/or net income. Also, we exclude articles 
that mention other accounting matters such as cash flow or asset turnover, but do not mention 
earnings related figures. Although some firms announce both consolidated and parent-only 
results, especially in the early years of our sample, we put priority on consolidated financial 
reporting over parent-only. We look at annual (full-year) and second quarter (half-year) 
earnings reports. For cumulative quarterly figures, net income is mostly not written up on 
preview articles. Therefore, we take numbers in the following order of priority: 1. Net 
income; 2. Ordinary income; and 3. Operating income. 
 We set the following rules to capture preview articles. First, the preview article has 
to appear after the last management forecast update (published the next day by Nikkei) prior 
to the annual (full-year), or half-year earnings announcement. Second, we take a conservative 
60 calendar day period before the actual earnings announcement date (including the 
                                                   
5 For instance, Nikkei article reports that “(Firm name)’s net income at (fiscal year) is likely to be about 
(preview figure), and this figure is the best ever for this firm.” 
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announcement day itself). We drop preview-like articles written about firms’ financial 
performance appearing a long time before the announcement, since they are not immediately 
value-relevant. Note that we do include “zero day” preview articles that are published on the 
day of announcement, a few hours ahead of the actual release by the firm. Third, we do not 
include preview-like articles that discuss only sales, but not income (ordinary, operating, or 
net) figures. As a result, our final sample contains 2,899 preview articles. Table 1 shows the 
details of the number of articles. 
 To our knowledge, the “preview” phenomenon has not yet been documented in the 
academic literature. We thus characterize our data in a descriptive fashion below. Some 
summary statistics are therefore deferred to sections below as needed.  
 
3. Timing of the Preview Articles 
First, we calculate the number of days before the actual announcement (calendar day 
difference between Actual Announcement Date minus Nikkei Preview Printed Date). We 
also calculate days after the latest management update, which is the calendar day difference 
between Preview Publishing Date minus Management Forecast Update Announcement Date 
(Nikkei publishes these updates in the next day’s paper).  
 Figure 2 shows the number of preview articles. The horizontal axis represents that 
calendar days prior to the announcement date. From 60 days prior to the announcement date, 
the frequency of preview articles increases gradually, but from 7 calendar days before the 
announcement, it increases above 100 per day. On the day of the announcement (Day 0), the 
number of preview articles peaks. 
Figure 3 shows the frequency of appearance of preview articles over time, from 
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January 2000 to December 2010. The articles appear more frequently from 2008, reflecting 
the fact that quarterly reporting (numbers reported are cumulative) became mandatory from 
that year. 
Table 2 summarizes the timing of the preview articles. These articles are written 
close to the actual company announcement. The mean and median number of days before the 
announcement are 19.44 and 14 days respectively, but many appear on the day of the 
announcement (the mode is 0, i.e., the morning of official announcement), and after the 
update of the latest official management forecast (mean of 120 days, median of 85 days). 
 
4. Are the Previews Biased? 
In this paper we make the assumption that the firm itself voluntarily communicates 
with Nikkei prior to the official announcement. We have no explicit evidence on the precise 
nature of this information channel. Under the assumption that selective disclosure by the firm 
(via whatever channel) is a strategic decision, it is of interest to see if preview articles have 
a bias toward positive or negative forecasts. Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura (2009) find a 
positive bias in initial management forecasts, issued at the time of the release of the most 
recent year’s results. We test to see if this is true of the Nikkei previews as well.  
 We divide the preview sample to two groups: (1) the figures actually announced 
turned out to be strictly better than the most recent management forecast update; and (2) the 
announced figures came out to be worse than (or equal to) the most recent management 
forecast. We use the management forecast as a benchmark because in Japan analysts do not 
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conduct earnings forecasts actively, and there is no average or consensus forecast.6 In case 
(1) above, we count the number of preview articles as “over” forecasting if they state numbers 
higher than the actual announcements, “under” forecasting if they are below the management 
forecasts, and “between” if they are in between the actual and management figures. In case 
(2), the “over” forecasts are when the preview articles point to numbers above the 
management forecasts, “under” forecasts are when previews mention estimates below the 
forthcoming announcements, and “between” when the previews lie below the management 
forecasts but above the actually announced numbers. If a preview article mentions two or 
more of sales, operating, ordinary, and net income, they are counted as separate reports (thus 
the total number of previews is 5,119). 
Table 3 shows the breakdown of counts of the preview articles. Information contained 
in the previews is more often “good news.” Out of 5,119 reports, 3,155 (61.6%) of them are 
written when actual performance is going to be better than the most recent management 
forecast (i.e., positive earnings surprise); whereas 1,964 (38.4%) of them are written when 
the announcement is going to be below the forecast (i.e., negative earnings surprise). Within 
the “good news” cases, about 70% of them are “modestly optimistic” and do not over-shoot 
in a sense that the previews report numbers in between the prior management forecast and 
the actual announcement. About 23% of the articles report higher number than actual, and 
only 7% of them under-forecast performance (i.e., the preview forecast is in the wrong 
direction). On the other hand, for bad news 50% of previews report numbers in between the 
recent management forecast and the actual (i.e., bad news is softened, or under-played in the 
                                                   
6 Ota (2006) finds that Japanese analyst forecast is generally of less quality than management forecast. 
16 
 
preview articles), and 44% of them report worse figures than the actual (i.e., overplay bad 
news). Only 6% of the articles go in wrong direction (over-forecast). 
The ratio of good-news to bad-news articles is consistent with management taking 
action to highlight positive earnings surprises, as opposed to a journalistic desire to attract 
readership by equally reporting both positive and negative surprises. To the credit of both 
management and Nikkei, 38.4% of articles are bad-news. This is a substantial fraction, and 
strong evidence of a functional, efficient information structure in Japan. The imbalance is 
also not surprising in light of the long-documented phenomenon in the U.S. that analysts 
upgrades of stocks are much more common than downgrades. This imbalance in the U.S. 
was generally attributed to selective analyst access to management prior to Reg FD, 
presumably based on a strategic choice by firm management. The ratio of positive to negative 
earnings surprises in Japan is also consistent with the strategic choice by the firm and the 
press. Of course there are other possible explanations that may be tested; e.g., prior 
management forecasts may be conservative or Nikkei subscribers prefer news about positive 
earnings surprises (perhaps due to the relative difficulty in exploiting negative news).  
The asymmetry in the over- vs. under-prediction has the result of rendering the 
official announcement following the Nikkei preview article relative good news in the case of 
both positive and negative earnings surprises. In the case of the positive earnings surprises, 
the official announcement has a 70% probability of being better the Nikkei preview. In the 
case of negative earnings surprises, the official announcement has a 44% of being better than 
the Nikkei preview. This is consistent with a strategic prior management forecast. For 
example, Cheng and Lo (2006) find that U.S. firms strategically manipulate forecasts to 
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reduce share prices prior to insider purchases. As we discuss below, we examine various 
theories about the extent to which the market properly adjusts for strategic information 
release. In simple terms, however, is the market “fooled” by the bias in over- or under-
prediction in the previews?  
 
5. Which Firms Are the Subject of Previews? 
 Nikkei does not write preview articles on all publicly traded firms. We examine 
which firms are written-up and how persistent it is. This is important, because investor 
reaction to the news is based upon expectations conditional upon the information channel 
and potentially understanding and relying on repeated patterns of disclosure. If management 
uses Nikkei previews in a strategic game of selective disclosure, do the market participants 
understand and rely on the rules of this game? 
There are 1,065 firms that are previewed at least once by Nikkei (the numbers of 
listed firms are 3,488 in December, 2000 and 3,693 in December, 2010). Table 4 shows the 
yearly counts of preview articles for the most frequently written-up firms. While some of the 
names of those firms may be familiar due to their widely known consumer products, it is not 
obvious from inspection of the table what types of firms are more frequently previewed. For 
the analysis we develop below, we single out firms that was previewed in the prior year, and 
then previewed again in the current year. For these firms, investors may expect the preview 
articles to appear in the current year as well, and so it indeed appears. We examine these 
firms in comparison to firms that are never previewed by Nikkei in terms of market reactions 
to the events such as preview publications and company announcements. We find 800 firm-
year observations of these firms, which we call “serially-previewed” firms. As a control, we 
18 
 
create a sample of market-cap matched firm-year observations for the firms that have no 
previews published in 2001 – 2010. Table 5 reports firm characteristics of “serially-
previewed” and “never-previewed” firms.  
Table 6 presents the results of a probit regression on the characteristics that distinguish 
“serially-previewed” from “never-previewed” firms. The table shows that larger firms with 
relatively high turn-over (i.e., liquidity) are more likely to be previewed. This is not 
surprising in light of Nikkei subscribers and market position. Big, widely held and traded 
companies are obviously of interest. From the perspective of traders who have the benefit of 
selective disclosure, the higher relative liquidity of these firms means that price impact is 
lower and hence trading profits on private information more profitable. The different 
specifications of the regression in Table 6 are also instructive. Not controlling for size, the 
proportion of foreign ownership (as opposed to Japanese domestic institutional ownership) 
is a positive predictor of previewing behavior. This is interesting in light of Nikkei’s recent 
decision to release preview articles in Japanese language only – presumably giving domestic 
investors a slight edge in interpretation of the subtlety accompanying and interpreting the 
numbers (a more complete analysis of this soft information component is the subject of our 
on-going research). 
 
6. Accuracy of Previewed Results 
The Nikkei preview articles are equivalent to “selective disclosure” in the pre-Reg 
FD U.S., except that they are published (solely) by Nikkei. A natural question is whether 
such previews are more accurate than previously available forecasts. We compute and 
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compare forecast errors for the most recent management forecast and the forecast in preview 
articles. Table 7 reports the results. 
Since there are relatively more preview articles published from seven calendar days 
before to the day of firms’ announcements, we also look at the accuracy of the [−7, 0] 
previews. Table 7 shows that these preview forecasts are much more precise than the updated 
management forecast. Further, within the [−7, 0] previews, we separate “serially-previewed” 
firms. This table essentially documents that the preview news is potentially value-relevant. 
Tables 8-1 and 8-2 report the accuracy of the preview forecast, compared with that of the 
latest management forecast. Table 8-1 is for all previews; 8-2 is for serial previewers, 8-3 is 
for the non-serial previewers. Table 8-4 is a test of the difference between the serial 
previewers and the non-serial previewers. Serially previewers have consistently more 
accurate information. 
 
7. Price Effects around Previews and Company Announcements  
Kyle (1985) is the main theoretical framework for empirical predictions about 
rational investor behavior in a market with asymmetric information – as trading goes to 
continuous time, prices are fully revealing and martingale, and speculators make positive 
profits thanks to “noise traders.” As a first step we test whether price dynamics around 
information events allow profits to informed investors. As a second step we examine the 
dynamics of various proposed microstructure measures. If, for example, strategic disclosure 
has benefits for the firm and its shareholders by improving price efficiency, there might be 




Figures 4A and 4B illustrate the basic price results. For previewing firms (Figure 4A) 
we find a positive price reaction to positive news but no negative price reaction to negative 
news. For non-previewing firms, 4B, prices rise significantly around the release of positive 
earnings news and drop around the release of negative earnings news. We also document 
evidence that the value-relevant information is released prior to both official earnings 
announcements for non-previewers and also for Nikkei previews. Price changes measured 
from open to open on the day prior to the official announcement (made during trading hours) 
or the Nikkei preview (available prior to market open) indicates likely leakage of news. For 
both groups, the returns on announcement day itself are flat. As pointed out above, this is 
consistent with the hypothesis that information when it appears in the news is already 
impounded in stock prices, and with a rational model of investor decision-making in the 
presence of asymmetric information where the probability of informed trade is correctly 
estimated by uninformed investors.  
The flat CARs for bad news are consistent with the hypothesis discussed above that 
firms may only release bad news via a preview when it is not expected to hurt stock price (or 
to not induce short-selling). The figures also show that the spread in CARs is persistent over 
the next two weeks following preview announcements but it converges for non-previewing 
firms around the official announcement. This suggests that the market may over-react rather 
than under-react to the official earnings announcement.  
The post-earnings announcement drift is documented in other countries, most 
prominently in the U.S., but is less prevalent in the Japanese market. It is generally believed 
to be associated with behavioral limitations of investors. Given the regulatory structure of 
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the U.S. market it makes it difficult to test cross-sectional differences in post earnings 
announcement drifts (PEAD) dependent upon different strategies for selective information 
disclosure by firms. The Japanese evidence suggests that firms use the Nikkei channel to 
disseminate value-relevant information to investors around earnings announcements, and 
these are effective at addressing potential under or over-reaction. The over-reaction around 
the official announcement days is a puzzle and the subject of further analysis. 
Figure 5 shows the price dynamics for previewing firms sorted out by the number of 
days separating the preview announcement and the official announcement. CARs are 
synchronized around the event day defined by the official news announcement. It shows no 
evidence of a “double reaction” i.e., first at preview, and then once again at the official release 
of earnings information. There is little evidence of under-reaction to recent prior news 
released via Nikkei. 
 
8. Incentives, Costs and Benefits of the Nikkei Previews for Related Parties 
Market microstructure research (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988) predicts that the 
presence of asymmetric information should be empirically manifested in lower volume (i.e., 
buyers and sellers trading on their disagreement between about the economic value of the 
security), higher volatility (arguably a measure of disagreement), and an increase in bid-ask 
spreads (indicative of concerns about adverse selection by market-makers), as informed and 
uninformed investors strategically adjust the timing of their trades to maximize profitability 
or minimize adverse selection.  
Our hypothesis is that preview articles provide an opportunity for informed traders 
to exploit an environment with lower spreads (hence less concerns about adverse selection). 
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As earnings season approaches, investors will naturally anticipate increasing probability of 
informed trades. News services provide an earnings calendar with expected dates for earnings 
releases. Investors use this information to assess the likelihood of informed trading. Krinsky 
and Lee (1996) show that spreads related to adverse selection increase prior to earnings 
announcements in the U.S. market. In contrast, the dates of the appearance of preview articles 
are not public, thus spreads may not increase as much in days prior to previews, making 
informed trading more profitable. In other words, the preview – particularly if it is not by a 
serially previewing firm, may be a strategy for allowing more profitable exploitation of 
private information. In the spirit of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the preview can be used to 
create an information event before which informed traders can trade in a less-suspicious 
environment.  
Table 9 reports average daily bid-ask spreads for three intervals abound previews 
and official announcement days. For official announcement day spreads we construct a 
matched sample of non-previewing firms based on size in the same fiscal year. We divide the 
table into good news and bad news events. We first test whether the spreads around preview 
days are higher or lower than the spreads for a matched sample of non-previewing firms on 
the days around official earnings announcement days.  
Our null hypothesis is that the spreads are the same. Our alternative is that the bid-
ask spreads for the day of the release of value-relevant information to informed traders -- 
when the date is known ex-ante -- are greater than when the date is not known ex-ante.   For 
good-news announcements, we find that spreads are significantly lower for previewers 
compared to non-previewers prior to and around the event date.  Evidence reported above 
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helps us assess market expectations about the timing of information released to informed 
traders. For official earnings announcement days, we show above that prices move a day or 
two before the release date. If the timing of this selective disclosure is common knowledge, 
then we would expect spreads due to adverse selection to increase over the same time interval. 
In contrast, if the day of the selective disclosure prior to a preview is unknown, or at least 
less predictable than disclosure dates preceding announcement days, then this would imply 
a significantly lower adverse selection-based bid-ask spread prior to previews compared to 
official announcements. 
We find strong evidence against the null. For the −3 to −1 day window, in which 
stock prices have been shown to move in the direction of earnings revisions, the difference 
in the bid-ask spread is significant for both good news and bad news events.  For good news 
events, the difference in spreads are significant in all three intervals: t-10 to 1-4, t-3 to t-1 
and t = 0.  For bad news events, the t-10 to t-4 and t=0 intervals are not significant. [check 
one-tailed test]. 
Table 9 shows several other interesting things. Note the change in spreads from the 
period t-10 to t-4 to t-3 to t-1. For previews, this increase is small.  For the matched sample, 
the increase is large. Spreads widen considerably in the three days prior to the official 
announcement compared to the preview sample, consistent with a rational anticipation of 
leakage in the days immediately preceding the announcement. The difference between the 
spreads in these two event windows is significant for the matched sample and not for the 
preview sample (check). Another feature of note is that the average spreads are significantly 
higher for bad news than for good news for all reported windows, for both the preview and 
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matched samples. This is a puzzle. It is consistent with the hypothesis that investors are more 
sensitive to negative disclosures compared to positive disclosures, however it is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that firms are more likely to disclose positive information. In a “game” 
of selective disclosure we noted above that companies appear to allow positive information 
to reach the market prior to preview or announcement, which would increase the probability 
of private information rather that decrease it when that information is good news. 
One additional complicating factor relevant to the interpretation of Table 9 results is 
that the decision to preview may be conditional upon price trends or bid-ask spread trends. 
For example, a firm planning to preview might not do it if the spreads or prices suddenly 
spike upwards, eliminating the benefit or necessity of selective disclosure via management-
related channels. 
  
9. Discussion and Conclusion 
The Nikkei preview phenomenon provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
selective disclosure strategies that differ from the current practice in the U.S., which is 
constrained by Regulation FD, and from the disclosure practice that prevailed in the U.S. 
prior to the enactment of Reg FD. Nikkei’s virtual monopoly on media release of earnings 
numbers prior to official announcement allows us to use one specific channel of press 
disclosure.  
The structure of information release in Japan offers a means to more sharply 
differentiate the response by investors to different types of information. Prior research on 
investor response to the probability of information asymmetry. has relied on more general 
information structures. Vega (2006) for example, uses the Easley and O’Hara (1992) PIN 
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measure to show that post-earnings announcement drift is lower when the probability of 
informed trading is higher. Our results are consistent with hers, but support the hypothesis 
that firms may play a decisive role in moving prices towards efficiency. Our also results 
provide additional insight into those reported by Tetlock (2010). While he also detects 
evidence of informed trading prior to the news, and documents a negative association with a 
liquidity, which is mitigated upon the news release. We are able to separate the release of 
information into two types: one for which the date of release is well-anticipated, and one for 
which it is less-so. We find that this leads to different patterns of investor behavior, and 
consequently different behavior of asset prices. 
We are able to document several features of the Nikkei preview phenomenon that 
suggest that it is strategically used by corporations to improve price efficiency. Preview 
numbers are more accurate than prior forecasts, which themselves may be strategically 
formed to ensure that the Nikkei updates are more likely to be perceived as good news. Price 
reactions around previews are positive for good news and flat for bad news. The company 
stock price on average benefits from this disclosure event and the benefits are permanent – 
in contrast to temporary effects around official earnings releases. This suggests that the prices 
discovered via the Nikkei preview process are efficient. 
 We find evidence that an early disclosure via Nikkei preview is accompanied with 
leakage prior to the preview event, resulting in a rise in share price before article publication. 
Price dynamics indicate that leakage occurs for official earnings announcements as well. By 
the same token, the absence of price movements on the actual day of information release 
suggests that uninformed as well as informed investors adjust their priors about the 
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probability of informed trading. Evidently the fact that one sees something in the news is 
prima facia evidence that prices already incorporate it. We find some evidence that uniformed 
investors are motivated to trade by a company appearing in the news – evidence documented 
in earlier markets. We also find that prices that were moved by the news (around the official 
earnings announcements) later revert – suggesting that there were not based on value-relevant 
economic fundamentals. 
Taken together, these phenomena suggest that the previews play a role in a complex 
strategic interaction among several parties. We conjecture that previews allow informed 
agents to trade in advance of wider spreads associated with adverse selection concerns around 
the official earnings announcement. The company may use Nikkei as the informational 
intermediary to facilitate this trading, and in doing so may weigh the costs and benefits of 
informed trading in its shares when selecting whether to preview. 
 The natural question is why this particular information revelation structure suits the 
various parties: firms, Nikkei, investors and regulators. From the firm’s perspective, the 
benefits to informed trading enumerated in Leland (1992) are straightforward: stock prices 
are higher, cost of capital lower, market prices are more fully revealing and investor risk is 
reduced. The cost to shareholders who sell shares at an adverse price may be small compared 
to the net benefits to long-term shareholders of the firm. 
Viewed through the lens of behavioral finance, previews provide opportunities for 
firms to reduce investor inattention and its adverse effects on share price and liquidity – to 
the extent that one component of liquidity is a consequence of breadth of ownership and 
awareness. Barber and Odean (2008) document the strong positive price effects of awareness 
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due to stocks being in the news. 
From Nikkei’s perspective, the ability to provide timely, accurate and exclusive 
information about corporate performance is the hallmark of a leading financial news provider. 
By serving as the principal medium for selective corporate disclosure they make themselves 
highly valuable to subscribers and to companies.  
From the perspective of various investor clienteles, the incentives are mixed. For 
investors who trade prior to news release, there is a potential enforcement risk if indeed their 
trades violate insider trading laws, however the performance benefits may be significant. We 
have not yet examined changes in institutional holdings to understand which clienteles 
exploits these opportunities. Bris (2005) documents a trade-off between profitability and 
enforcement of insider trading laws. In the Japanese case the sustained evidence of informed 
trading prior to the event may thus be associated with modest profitability.  
From a regulator’s perspective, one of the principal motivations of Reg FD was the 
promotion of liquidity through the reduction of information asymmetry. Improved liquidity 
seems like a good think, although as the volume of trade by uninformed speculators increases, 
so do uncompensated transactions costs. In our study, since the decision to use previews is 
endogenous, liquidity differences between previewing and non-previewing firms will not 
likely be informative, and thus this paper does not address net welfare benefits of a non-Reg 
FD environment. 
The case of Japan’s Nikkei preview articles demonstrates that, in the absence of Reg 
FD, a richer strategy space for information disclosure, timing of trades and avoidance of 
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Figure 1. Example of Earnings Announcement on Nikkei Newspaper 
 
An example of earnings announcement (based on Tan-Shin – Early Reports) published in Nikkei Newspaper. 
 
Nikkei Morning Section, January 30, 2014: 
キヤノン (7751)米国基準                               3.28 
12.12    34797  342557  224564    191.3   記 130.0 
13.12    37313  347604  230483    200.8     130.0 
14.12 予  38500  360000  240000    179.9     130.0 
 
 
Legend of the above: 
キヤノン: Canon, 7751: Japanese security code or SEDOL, 米国基準: US GAAP, Date of SH mtg. 
Yr. Mo.  Sales    Cur. Inc. Net Inc.   EPS        Dividends/share 
         100M      ¥M     ¥M          ¥              ¥ 
14.12 予: Management forecast for the fiscal year ending December 2014 






Figure 2. Number of Preview Articles Over Time 
 
This figure shows the time-series distribution of the Nikkei Preview articles, relative to the date of company’s 
announcements. The announcements are on sales and/or operating income and/or ordinary income and/or net 
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Figure 3. Preview Articles over Time 
 
The figure shows the time-series distribution of the Nikkei Preview. The announcements are on sales and/or 
operating income and/or ordinary income and/or net income. Our priority rule is to take the last (net income) 






















































































































































































































Figure 4A. CARs for Preview Article Publications 
 




Figure 4B. CARs for Company Announcement Publications (for Non-Previewers) 
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Figure 5. CARs for [-7, 0] Preview Publications 
 






















Response to Preview Article Publications (Open(t) to Open(t+1)) 
Positive Change from Mgt.F to Preview article publication Negative Change from Mgt.F to Preview article publication
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Figure 6. Responses to Company Announcement for [-7, 0] Previews 
 
This figure reports CARs plotted from 10 days before to 3 days after the company announcement for previewed 
firms whose articles appeared 7 days before to the day of the announcement. Vertical axis is in percentage. “0” 
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Preview about Total Annual (12 month 
period)
Quarterly (9 month 
period)
Quarterly (6 month 
period)
Quarterly (3 month 
period)
Sales 2,563 1,117 166 957 323
Operating income 1,799 734 132 679 254
Ordinary income 1,684 794 73 671 146
Net income 1,512 800 51 587 74
Total 2,899 1,286 181 1,085 347















Days_before_company_ann 2,899 19.44 5 14 33 0 60 0
Days_after_mgt_update 2,280 120.22 79.5 123 161 3 374 85
Days_between_update_and_company_ann 2,280 141.91 93 167 182 7 377 182
Days_after_prior_company_ann 619 353.67 349 358 362 302 380 362
"Over" Fraction "Between" Fraction "Under" Fraction "Over" Fraction "Between" Fraction "Under" Fraction
Sales 286 26.7% 734 68.6% 50 4.7% 49 5.2% 488 52.1% 399 42.6%
Operating income 48 19.5% 184 74.8% 14 5.7% 6 6.4% 54 57.4% 34 36.2%
Ordinary income 221 21.5% 761 74.0% 46 4.5% 14 3.5% 182 45.2% 207 51.4%
Net income 179 22.1% 579 71.5% 52 8.2% 41 7.7% 260 49.1% 229 43.2%
Total 734 23.3% 2,258 71.6% 162 6.7% 110 5.6% 984 50.1% 869 44.3%
Grand Total 3,155 61.6% 1,964 38.4%
Actual > Mgt.forecast Actual < Mgt.forecast
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Name y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009 y2010 Row Total
1 Canon Inc. 1 0 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 22
2 Obic Co., Ltd. 0 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 2 21
3 Kao Corp. 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 20
4 Aeon Mall Co., Ltd. 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 2 2 3 3 20
5 Shimamura Co., Ltd. 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 4 20
6 NTN Corp. 2 1 0 1 2 2 4 3 0 0 1 16
7 Nachi-Fujikoshi Corp. 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 16
8 Terumo Corp. 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 3 2 3 2 16
9 Mitsubishi Shokuhin Co., Ltd. 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 16
10 Mitsubishi Logistics Corp. 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 4 2 3 15
11 Toho Co., Ltd. 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 0 1 15
12 Sekisui House, Ltd. 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 14
13 Yamazaki Baking Co., Ltd. 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 0 14
14 Asahi Group Holdings, Ltd. 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 14
15 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 0 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 0 2 2 14
16 Toyota Motor Corp. 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 14
17 Computer Engineering & Consulting Ltd. 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 0 0 14
18 Kirin Holdings Co., Ltd. 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 13
19 FamilyMart Co., Ltd. 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 13
20 Saizeriya Co., Ltd. 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 1 3 13
21 Calpis Co., Ltd. 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 12
22 Oji Holdings Corp. 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 12
23 Showa Denko K.K. 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 12
24 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd. 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 12
25 Yamato Holdings Co., Ltd. 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 3 12
26 Oricon Inc. 0 0 2 4 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 12
27 Daiwa House Industry Co., Ltd. 2 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 11
28 Kaneka Corp. 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 11
29 Lion Corp. 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 11
30 KDDI Corp. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 0 11
31 Otsuka Kagu, Ltd. 1 2 2 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 11
32 Fujifilm Holdings Corp. 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 10
33 Unicharm Corp. 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 10
34 Tokyo Tatemono Co., Ltd. 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 10
35 Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd. 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 3 0 10
36 Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 2 1 10
37 LIXIL Group Corp. 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 2 10
38 Mandom Corp. 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 2 10
39 Daiichikosho Co., Ltd. 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 10
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Table 5. Firm Characteristics of Serially Previewed vs. Non-Previewed Firms 
 
Firms with preview are the ones that are written up in Nikkei preview articles in year t and t + 1 during 2000 – 2010. Firms without preview are the ones 
that were never written up in the same period (sample starts in 2001), and matched with firms with preview by market cap. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Mean Test (With - W/O) Median Test (With - W/O)
Variable N Mean Std.dev. Median Min. Max. N Mean Std.dev. Median Min. Max. Difference t -value Difference Z -value
Market cap. (million yen) 800 648,663 1,883,088 162,787 1,225 27,300,000 800 375,108 605,340 163,586 1,227 5,452,056 273,556 3.91 *** -799 1.00
Proportion of individual investors (%) 800 29.68 19.71 24.44 1.43 97.59 800 30.08 17.56 27.16 2.37 96.07 -0.40 -0.43 -2.72 -1.54
Proportion of institutional investors (%) 800 53.31 16.89 54.09 2.12 94.41 800 56.81 17.41 57.31 1.73 97.38 -3.50 -4.08 *** -3.22 -4.13 ***
Proportion of foreign investors (%) 800 16.91 12.82 15.70 0.00 68.82 800 12.86 12.78 9.07 0.00 73.30 4.05 6.33 *** 6.63 7.31 ***
Proportion of the special few SHs (%) 800 45.11 18.49 42.93 0.00 92.15 800 43.01 20.01 40.37 0.00 118.07 2.10 2.18 ** 2.56 3.30 ***
Floating shares (%) 800 3.52 7.87 0.00 0.00 45.32 800 4.32 9.45 0.00 0.00 60.29 -0.80 -1.83 * 0.00 -0.47
Turnover 800 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.00 3.21 800 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.99 0.01 1.97 ** 0.02 5.65 ***
Listing on TSE 1st section 800 0.81 0.39 1.00 0.00 1.00 800 0.83 0.38 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.01 -0.65 0.00 -0.65
Firm-year obs. with preview Firm-year obs. without preview
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Table 6. Regression on Which Firms Are Previewed 
 
This table reports the regressions coefficients for a probit model. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
around firms. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm-year with preview is the firm-year that has preview 
articles in that year (t) and year t-1. There are 800 such firm-year observations. Market-cap matched observations 
of “never previewed” firms are added. The independent variables and their definitions of the independent variables 
are as follows: the logarithm of market capitalization (in million yen), proportion of individual investors is the 
number of shares owned by individual investors relative to the total number of shares, proportion of institutional 
investors is the number of shares owned by financial institutions, financial product dealers, and other corporations 
relative to the total number of shares, proportion of foreign investors is the number of shares owned by foreign 
corporations relative to the total number of shares, proportion of the special few shareholders is the number of 
shares owned by insiders and closely-affiliated firms relative to the total number of shares, floating shares is the 
number of freely floating shares relative to the total number of shares, turnover is the monthly average of the 
number of shares traded divided by the total shares outstanding, listed on TSE 1st section equal to one if the firm 
is listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The estimation includes industry fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. The sample includes between 2000 and 2010. ***, **, and * denote coefficient estimates significantly 




Log(Market cap.) 0.171*** 0.172***
(0.033) (0.033)
Proportion of individual investors (%) 0.005** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Proportion of institutional investors (%) -0.005** -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Proportion of foreign investors (%) 0.007* 0.002 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Proportion of the special few SHs (%) -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Floating shares (%) 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Turnover 0.076 0.076 0.158 0.157
(0.278) (0.278) (0.282) (0.282)
Listing on TSE 1st section -0.008 -0.007 0.220** 0.222**
(0.113) (0.113) (0.103) (0.103)
Constant -3.705*** -3.186*** -1.712*** -1.615***
(0.483) (0.424) (0.286) (0.293)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Pseudo R -squared 0.240 0.240 0.227 0.228









N Mean p25 Median p75 Min. Max.
Panel A: Management Forecast Error - Comparing latest management forecast with realized figures
Sales 2,278 6.861 0.568 1.703 5.015 0.000 856.146
Operating Income 468 1.161 0.280 0.673 1.325 0.000 19.974
Ordinary Iincome 2,275 1.409 0.224 0.577 1.333 0.000 64.167
Net Income 2,278 1.680 0.153 0.379 0.920 0.000 232.062
Panel B. Preview Error - Comparing preview numbers with realized figures
Sales 2,008 2.432 0.120 0.417 1.405 0.000 659.878
Operating Income 1,356 1.048 0.042 0.139 0.413 0.000 419.900
Ordinary Iincome 1,432 0.405 0.038 0.123 0.341 0.000 20.514
Net Income 1,344 0.752 0.031 0.107 0.340 0.000 173.348
Management Forecast Error = |latest management forecast - realized figure|*100/Market cap [million yen] 
at the end of the month prior to preview release.
Preview Error = |preview figure - realized figure|*100/Market cap [million yen] at the end of the month 
prior to preview release.
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N Mean p25 Median p75 Min. Max.
Panel A: Management Forecast Error - Comparing latest management forecast with realized figures
Sales 700 5.309 0.571 1.575 4.588 0.000 146.019
Operating Income 168 1.104 0.280 0.624 1.229 0.000 16.740
Ordinary Iincome 700 1.150 0.189 0.504 0.991 0.000 64.167
Net Income 700 1.253 0.122 0.326 0.707 0.000 136.824
Panel B: Preview Error - Comparing preview numbers with realized figures
Sales 624 1.434 0.066 0.256 0.818 0.000 91.019
Operating Income 394 0.915 0.022 0.077 0.219 0.000 216.110
Ordinary Iincome 446 0.194 0.018 0.054 0.164 0.000 15.272
Net Income 400 0.565 0.019 0.044 0.136 0.000 132.492
Management Forecast Error = |latest management forecast - realized figure|*100/Market cap [million yen] at the end of the
month prior to preview release.
Preview Error = |preview figure - realized figure|*100/Market cap [million yen] at the end of the month prior to preview
release.
N Mean p25 Median p75 Min. Max.
Panel A: Management Forecast Error - Comparing latest management forecast with realized figures
Sales 496 4.449 0.534 1.435 4.148 0.000 134.219
Operating Income 121 0.865 0.181 0.555 1.020 0.000 8.424
Ordinary Iincome 496 0.842 0.172 0.425 0.788 0.000 45.608
Net Income 496 0.883 0.102 0.294 0.631 0.001 127.587
Panel B: Preview Error - Comparing preview numbers with realized figures
Sales 457 1.272 0.065 0.242 0.742 0.000 91.019
Operating Income 299 0.204 0.021 0.069 0.195 0.000 5.822
Ordinary Iincome 312 0.194 0.017 0.050 0.145 0.000 15.272
Net Income 300 0.555 0.016 0.037 0.112 0.000 132.492
Only preview articles of serially previewed firms within a week prior to company announcement (i.e., between -7 to 0).
44 
 
Table 8 – 3. Accuracy of [-7, 0] Day Previews – “Non-Serially” Previewed Firms 
 
 
Table 8 – 4. Tests for Difference between “Serially” and “Non-Serially” Previewed Firms 
 
  
N Mean p25 Median p75 Min. Max.
Panel A: Management Forecast Error - Comparing latest management forecast with realized figures
Sales 204 7.400 0.665 1.975 5.972 0.001 146.019
Operating Income 47 1.718 0.429 0.871 1.383 0.043 16.740
Ordinary Iincome 204 1.899 0.281 0.663 1.562 0.000 64.167
Net Income 204 2.152 0.195 0.436 1.002 0.000 136.824
Panel B: Preview Error - Comparing preview numbers with realized figures
Sales 167 1.877 0.070 0.319 1.093 0.000 53.330
Operating Income 95 3.153 0.024 0.104 0.407 0.000 216.110
Ordinary Iincome 134 0.196 0.022 0.082 0.187 0.000 2.984
Net Income 100 0.594 0.029 0.093 0.254 0.000 20.333
Only preview articles of non-serially previewed firms within a week prior to company announcement (i.e., between -7 to 0).
Difference in mean Difference in median
Panel A: Management Forecast Error - Comparing latest management forecast with realized figures
Sales -2.951 *** -0.540 **
Operating Income -0.853 ** -0.315 ***
Ordinary Iincome -1.058 *** -0.238 ***
Net Income -1.269 ** -0.142 ***
Panel B: Preview Error - Comparing preview numbers with realized figures
Sales -0.606 -0.077
Operating Income -2.949 ** -0.035 **
Ordinary Iincome -0.002 -0.033 **
Net Income -0.039 -0.056 ***
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Table 9. Abnormal Returns, Volatilities, and Volumes, and Spreads 
 
Cumulative abnormal return is the value of daily abnormal returns, summed over the window indicated. Daily 
abnormal returns during the event window are defined as the raw return minus the expected return, which is 
estimated using market model. Abnormal return volatility is the absolute value of daily abnormal returns, 
summed over the window indicated. Abnormal trading volume is the difference between trading volume and 
the mean of daily volume for that stock over the pre-preview (or pre-announcement) publication window [-
270,-21], normalized by the mean volume, then summed over a window. Spread is defined as end of the day 
quoted (ask-bid)*100/((ask+bid)/2) (averaged over the window indicated). Panel A presents the results of 
abnormal returns, volatilities, volumes, and spreads response to good news. Panel B presents the results 















Cumlative Abnormal Return (-10, -4) 665 -0.055 1,238 -0.181 0.127 0.525
Cumlative Abnormal Return (-3, -1) 669 0.875 *** 1,253 0.460 *** 0.415 1.799 *
Cumlative Abnormal Return (-1, +1) 675 0.918 *** 1,256 0.480 *** 0.437 1.644
Abnormal Return day 0 680 -0.024 1,279 0.074 -0.098 -0.704
Abnormal Return Volatility (-10, -4) 665 10.573 *** 1,238 9.807 *** 0.766 2.141 **
Abnormal Return Volatility (-3, -1) 669 5.291 *** 1,253 5.372 *** -0.082 -0.337
Abnormal Return Volatility (-1, +1) 675 5.656 *** 1,256 6.020 *** -0.363 -1.424
Return Volatility day 0 680 1.795 *** 1,279 1.988 *** -0.193 -1.836 *
Abnormal Trading Volume (-10, -4) 682 0.421 1,317 1.058 ** -0.637 -0.824
Abnormal Trading Volume (-3, -1) 682 -0.010 1,317 0.681 ** -0.691 -1.773 *
Abnormal Trading Volume (-1, +1) 682 1.137 *** 1,317 2.077 *** -0.940 -1.584
Abnormal Trading Volume day 0 682 0.719 *** 1,317 1.028 *** -0.309 -1.021
Averaged spread (-10, -4) 639 0.569 *** 1,239 0.596 *** -0.027 -0.814
Averaged spread (-3, -1) 655 0.578 *** 1,267 0.674 *** -0.097 -2.448 **
Averaged spread (-1, +1) 654 0.564 *** 1,254 0.672 *** -0.108 -2.687 ***













Cumlative Abnormal Return (-10, -4) 444 -0.072 1,057 -0.107 0.035 0.113
Cumlative Abnormal Return (-3, -1) 445 0.075 1,079 -0.523 *** 0.599 2.196 **
Cumlative Abnormal Return (-1, +1) 447 -0.049 1,089 -0.261 0.212 0.721
Abnormal Return day 0 450 -0.059 1,098 0.028 -0.087 -0.515
Abnormal Return Volatility (-10, -4) 444 11.249 *** 1,057 10.980 *** 0.269 0.562
Abnormal Return Volatility (-3, -1) 445 5.435 *** 1,079 5.573 *** -0.137 -0.534
Abnormal Return Volatility (-1, +1) 447 5.711 *** 1,089 6.208 *** -0.497 -1.770 *
Return Volatility day 0 450 1.815 *** 1,098 2.042 *** -0.227 -1.777 *
Abnormal Trading Volume (-10, -4) 461 0.604 * 1,129 1.107 -0.503 -0.300
Abnormal Trading Volume (-3, -1) 461 -0.034 1,129 0.491 -0.524 -0.892
Abnormal Trading Volume (-1, +1) 461 0.889 *** 1,129 1.575 *** -0.686 -0.758
Abnormal Trading Volume day 0 461 0.559 *** 1,129 0.811 *** -0.252 -0.677
Averaged spread (-10, -4) 431 0.645 *** 1,051 0.658 *** -0.013 -0.295
Averaged spread (-3, -1) 441 0.632 *** 1,080 0.729 *** -0.097 -1.995 **
Averaged spread (-1, +1) 440 0.639 *** 1,070 0.716 *** -0.077 -1.591
Spread day 0 450 0.634 *** 1,089 0.713 *** -0.080 -1.453
Preview publication date
Preview publication date
Panel A. "Good news" (positive surprise) cases
Mean test
Panel B. "Bad news" (negative surprise) cases
Matched company announcement
publication date
Mean test
Matched company announcement
publication date
